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Two currently active strands of research on logics for multi-agent systems are dynamic
epistemic logic, focusing on the epistemic consequences of actions, and logics of coali-
tional ability, focusing on what coalitions of agents can achieve by cooperating strategically.
In this paper we bridge these topics by considering the question: “what can a coalition
achieve by making public announcements?”. We propose an extension of public announce-
ment logic with constructs of the form 〈G〉φ, where G is a group of agents, with the
intuitive meaning that G can jointly execute a publicly observable action such that φ will
be true afterwards. Actions here are taken to be truthful public announcements, but turn out
also to include sequences of such joint actions as well as protocols with alternating actions
by different agents, in response to the actions of others. We also study in detail the differ-
ence between ‘knowing how’ (knowing de re) and ‘knowing that’ (knowing de dicto) in our
framework: both can elegantly be expressed in the single-agent case. We present several
meta-logical properties of this Group Announcement Logic, including a sound and complete
axiomatization, expressivity and the complexity of model checking.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Analysis of the dynamics of knowledge has received some attention recently, see [20] for an overview. Van Benthem
[18] and Balbiani et al. [4] suggested an interpretation of the standard modal diamond where φ means “there is an
announcement after which φ”. This was in a setting going back to the Fitch-paradox [8]. The new interpretation of the
diamond  in the Fitch setting ﬁrstly interprets φ as ‘sometime later, φ’, and secondly speciﬁes this temporal speciﬁcation
as what may result of a speciﬁc event, namely a public announcement: ‘after some announcement, φ’. In other words, the
semantics is: φ is true if and only if 〈ψ〉φ is true for some ψ ; the expression 〈ψ〉φ stands for ‘ψ is true and after ψ is
announced, φ is true’. There are some restrictions on ψ . The resulting arbitrary announcement logic is axiomatizable and
has various pleasing properties (again, see [4], and for more detail the extended journal version [5]).
Arbitrary announcement logic makes no assumption in the interpretation of φ about who makes the announcement,
or indeed whether or not the announcement can be truthfully made by anyone. In the current contribution we investigate
a variant of arbitrary announcement logic. Instead of φ we use a more speciﬁc operator, namely 〈G〉φ. Here G is a
subgroup of all agents that simultaneously make truthful public announcements, i.e., announcements of formulae they know.
In other words, let G = {1, . . . ,k}, then: 〈G〉φ is true if and only if there exist formulae ψ1, . . . ,ψk such that 〈K1ψ1 ∧
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: thomas.agotnes@infomedia.uib.no (T. Ågotnes), hvd@us.es (H. van Ditmarsch), seban@irit.fr (P. Seban).
1 Also aﬃliated with Bergen University College.
2 The author acknowledges support of the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study where he was Lorentz Fellow in 2008. He is also aﬃliated with the
University of Otago, New Zealand, and during work for this article in 2008 he was aﬃliated with IRIT, France.1570-8683/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2008.12.002
T. Ågotnes et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 62–81 63· · · Kkψk〉φ is true; now, the expression 〈K1ψ1 ∧ · · · Kkψk〉φ stands for K1ψ1 ∧ · · · Kkψk is true and after agents 1, . . . ,k,
simultaneously announce ψ1, . . . ,ψk , then φ is true’. Note that the remaining agents, not included in the set G of k agents,
are not involved in making the announcement, although they are aware of that action happening. The resulting logic is
called Group Announcement Logic (GAL).
Informally speaking, 〈G〉φ expresses the fact that coalition G has the ability to make φ come about. Logics modelling
the coalitional abilities of agents have been an active area of research in multi-agent systems in recent years, the most
prominent frameworks being Pauly’s Coalition Logic [16] and Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman’s Alternating-time Temporal
Logic [3]. The main constructs of these logics are indeed of the form 〈G〉φ with the intuitive meaning that coalition G
can achieve φ. In this paper we investigate these notions when the actions that can be performed are truthful public
announcements.
Section 2 contains an introduction into public announcement logic, and arbitrary public announcement logic. Section 3
deﬁnes group announcement logic, presents various interaction axioms between the different modalities that express intu-
itive properties of such joint announcements, and the axiomatization. Section 4 is entirely devoted to expressivity matters,
and Section 5 to model checking. The relation between group announcement logic and various notions of group ability, in-
cluding knowledge ‘de re’ and knowledge ‘de dicto’, is discussed in detail in Section 6, which is followed by a more applied
Section 7 that embeds these observations into security protocols for two agents (sender and receiver) in the presence of a
ﬁnite number of eavesdroppers intercepting all communications between them. The paper is based on but greatly extend a
part of [2].
2. Background
2.1. Structures
Let N = {1, . . . ,n} be a ﬁnite set of agents, n > 0, and Θ be a countable set of primitive propositions. A Kripke structure
(or model) over N and Θ is a tuple M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) where S is a set of states, ∼i ⊆ S × S is an epistemic indis-
tinguishability relation and is assumed to be an equivalence relation for each agent i ∈ N , and V :Θ → 2S assigns primitive
propositions to the states in which they are true. A pointed Kripke structure is a pair (M, s) where s is a state in M.
Bisimulation is a well-known notion of structural similarity [6] that we will frequently use in examples and proofs, e.g.
to achieve our expressivity results.
Let two models M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) and M′ = (S ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′) be given. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S ′ is
a bisimulation between M and M′ iff for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S ′ with (s, s′) ∈R:
atoms for all p ∈ Θ: s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p);
forth for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ S: if s ∼i t , then there is a t′ ∈ S ′ such that s′ ∼′i t′ and (t, t′) ∈R;
back for all i ∈ N and all t′ ∈ S ′: if s′ ∼′i t′ , then there is a t ∈ S such that s ∼i t and (t, t′) ∈R.
We write (M, s)↔ (M′, s′), iff there is a bisimulation between M and M′ linking s and s′ , and we then call the pointed
Kripke structures (M, s) and (M′, s′) bisimilar.
2.2. Public announcement logic
The language Lpal of public announcement logic (PAL) [17] over N and Θ is deﬁned as follows, where i ∈ N and p ∈ Θ:
ϕ ::= p | Kiϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | [ϕ1]ϕ2
We write 〈φ1〉φ2 resp. Kˆ iϕ for the duals ¬[φ1]¬φ2 and ¬Ki¬ϕ .
The interpretation of formulae in a pointed Kripke structure is deﬁned as follows (the other clauses are deﬁned in the
usual truth-functional way).
M, s | Kiφ iff for every t such that s ∼i t, M, t | φ
M, s | [φ]ψ iff M, s | φ implies that M|φ, s | ψ
where M|φ = (S ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′) such that S ′ = {s′ ∈ S: M, s′ | φ}; ∼′i = ∼i ∩ (S ′ × S ′); V ′(p) = V (p)∩ S ′ .
The purely epistemic fragment of the language (i.e., formulae not containing public announcement operators [φ]) is
denoted Lel . It was already shown in Plaza’s original publication on that logic [17] that the language of PAL is equally
expressive as the purely epistemic fragment within the class of all models.
2.3. Arbitrary public announcement logic
Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) extends public announcement logic with an additional inductive constructφ. Its interpretation is:
M, s |φ iff for all ψ ∈ Lel: M, s | [ψ]φ
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epistemically deﬁnable submodels containing the actual state. Two typical validities for the logic, which we will see recur in
similar form in group announcement logic, are: |φ →φ (4) and |φ →φ (Church–Rosser). A crucial semantic
result, which we will also see reappear in different form, is that if φ is true in some epistemic state (M, s), i.e., if a true
epistemic formula ψ can be announced to make φ true, then, for some atom p not occurring in φ, 〈p〉φ is true in model
M′ that is exactly as model M except for the valuation of the announced p and of possibly other atoms not occurring
in φ.
The logic APAL is more expressive than public announcement logic within the class of all models, it is not compact, and it
has a complete axiomatization (see [4] and [5] for details). The axioms and inference rules involving arbitrary announcement
are:
φ → [ψ]φ where ψ ∈ Lel
From φ, infer φ
From ψ → [θ][p]φ, infer ψ → [θ]φ where p /∈ Θψ ∪Θθ ∪Θφ
where Θφ denotes the set of atoms occurring in a formula φ.
3. Group announcement logic
The main construct of the language of group announcement logic (GAL) is 〈G〉ϕ , intuitively meaning that there is some
announcement the group G can truthfully make after which ϕ will be true. Such a simultaneous announcement may sound
like a lot of unintelligible noise. But in fact it merely means a joint public action – not necessarily involving talking. We will
later even ﬁnd ways to model subsequent announcements as sequences of simultaneous actions, making the basic semantic
idea even less appear as shouting in groups.
3.1. Language
The language Lgal of GAL is deﬁned by extending the language of PAL with a new operator [G] for each coalition G:
Deﬁnition 1 (Language).
ϕ ::= p | Kiϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | [G]ϕ | [ϕ1]ϕ2
where i is an agent, G is a set of agents and p ∈ Θ . We write 〈G〉ϕ for the dual ¬[G]¬ϕ and 〈i〉φ for 〈{i}〉φ. For the subset
of atoms occurring in a formula φ we, again, write Θφ .
We adopt the standard deﬁnition for the notion of subformula.
3.2. Semantics
The interpretation of formulae in a pointed Kripke structure is deﬁned by extending the deﬁnition for PAL with a clause
for the new operator:
Deﬁnition 2 (Semantics). By induction on formula structure:
M, s | p iff p ∈ V (p)
M, s | Kiφ iff for every t such that s ∼i t, M, t | φ
M, s | ¬φ iff not M, s | φ
M, s | φ ∧ψ iff M, s | φ and M, s | ψ
M, s | [φ]ψ iff M, s | φ implies that M|φ, s | ψ where M|φ is as in Section 2.2
M, s | [G]φ iff for every set {ψi: i ∈ G} ⊆ Lel, M, s | [
∧
i∈G Kiψi]φ
We get the following meaning for the dual:
M, s | 〈G〉φ iff there exists a set {ψi: i ∈ G} ⊆ Lel such that M, s | 〈
∧
i∈G Kiψi〉φ
If we write this out in detail, we get: M, s | 〈G〉φ iff there exists a set {ψi: i ∈ G} ⊆ Lel such that M, s |
∧
i∈G Kiψi and
M|∧i∈G Kiψi, s | φ.
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of 〈G〉φ the formulae ψi in ∧i∈G Kiψi cannot be unrestricted Lgal formulas, as that would make the deﬁnition circular: such
a ψi could then be the formula 〈G〉φ itself that we are trying to interpret. We therefore avoid quantifying over formulae
containing 〈G〉 operators. However, as public announcement logic is equally expressive as epistemic logic within the class
of all models, the semantics obtained by quantifying over the fragment of the language without 〈G〉 operators is the same
as the semantics obtained by quantifying only over epistemic formulae.
As usual, a formula φ is valid on M, notation M | φ, iff M, s | φ for all s in the domain of M; and a formula φ is
valid, | φ, iff M | φ for all M. The denotation of φ on M, notation φM is deﬁned as {s ∈ S | M, s | φ}. The set of
validities of the logic is called GAL (group announcement logic).
Proposition 3. Let two models M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) and M′ = (S ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′) be given. Let ϕ ∈ Lgal be a formula. For all
s ∈ S and for all s′ ∈ S ′ , if (M, s)↔ (M′, s′) then M, s | ϕ iff M′, s′ | ϕ .
Proof. As usual, the proof is done by induction on ϕ . 
3.3. Logical properties
To sharpen the intuition about the logic we mention some relevant validities, with particular attention to interaction
between group announcement and epistemic modal operators. Examples are | [G]φ → [G][G]φ (Corollary 6), | 〈G〉[G]φ →
[G]〈G〉φ (Corollary 11), and Ki[i]φ ↔ [i]Kiφ (Proposition 12).
3.3.1. Elementary validities
Proposition 4.
1. 〈G〉p → p and 〈G〉¬p → ¬p (atomic propositions do not change value)
2. 〈∅〉φ ↔ [∅]φ ↔ φ (the empty group is powerless)
3. 〈K j1ψ j1 ∧ · · · ∧ K jkψ jk 〉φ → 〈{ j1, . . . , jk}〉φ
4. φ → 〈G〉φ (truth axiom)
Proof.
1. In public announcement logic, and its ‘derivatives’, factual truths never change value.
2. The conjunction of an empty set of formulae is, as usual, taken to be a tautology.
3. Obvious (note that ψ j1 , . . . ,ψ jk are purely epistemic formulas).
4. If all agents announce ‘true’, nothing changes to the system. 
An announcement by the empty group (the second property above) corresponds to a ‘clock tick’, a dynamic transition
without informative effect. We could also see this as “nobody says a thing” (and this now happens. . .). In fact you could
even see this as ‘everybody says true’, an announcement by the public (as in the fourth property): in other words, the group
of all agents have the option not to exercise their power.
3.3.2. Sequences of group announcements
Intuitively, 〈G〉φ means that G can achieve a situation where φ is true in ‘one step’, by making a joint announcement.
One can easily imagine situations where it could be interesting to reason about what a group can achieve by making
repeated announcements, i.e., by a sequence of announcements, one after the other, or a communication protocol. A general
example is a conversation over an open channel. We want to express that “there is some sequence, of arbitrary length, of
announcements by G which will ensure that φ becomes true”.
For arbitrary announcement logic (APAL), the validity of the principle φ → φ follows from the simple observation
that a sequence of two announcements ψ and χ is equivalent to the single announcement of ψ ∧ [ψ]χ . Less obvious is
that [G]φ → [G][G]φ is also valid, because now we have to show that two conjunctions of known formulas are again such a
conjunction.
Proposition 5. | [G ∪ H]φ → [G][H]φ.
Proof. The diamond version 〈G〉〈H〉φ → 〈G ∪ H〉φ of this validity makes clear that the requirement is that two succes-
sive announcements respectively by the agents in G simultaneously and in H simultaneously can also be seen as a single
announcement by the agents in G ∪ H simultaneously. Let us prove how it can be done. Consider two successive announce-
ments
∧
i∈G Kiφi and
∧
j∈H K jψ j . Let a Kripke structure M and a state s in M be given such that M, s |
∧
i∈G Kiφi , and
similarly
∧
j∈H K jψ j is true in state s in the restriction of M to the
∧
i∈G Kiφi-states: M|
∧
i∈G Kiφi, s |
∧
j∈H K jψ j .
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M, s | 〈∧i∈G Kiφi〉〈∧ j∈H K jψ j〉θ
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G Kiφi ∧ [∧g∈G Kgφg]∧ j∈H K jψ j〉θ
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G Kiφi ∧∧i∈H\G Ki ∧ [∧g∈G Kgφg](∧ j∈H K jψ j ∧∧ j∈G\H K j)〉θ
because for any agent i, Ki is a valid formula
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G∪H (Kiφi ∧ [∧g∈G Kgφg]Kiψi)〉θ
with ∀i ∈ H\G, φi =  and ∀ j ∈ G\H, ψ j = 
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G∪H (Kiφi ∧ (∧g∈G Kgφg) → Ki[∧g∈G Kgφg]ψi)〉θ
by a reduction axiom of PAL
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G∪H Kiφi ∧∧i∈G∪H ((∧ j∈G K jφ j) → Ki[∧ j∈G K jφ j]ψi)〉θ
by distributing the ∧
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G∪H Kiφi ∧∧i∈G∪H Ki[∧ j∈G K jφ j]ψi〉θ
because
∧
j∈G K jφ j is assumed true in the left conjunct of the announcement
only if M, s | 〈∧i∈G∪H Ki(φi ∧ [∧ j∈G K jφ j]ψi)〉θ. 
Corollary 6. | [G]φ → [G][G]φ.
We thus get exactly the property alluded to above:
Corollary 7. M, s | 〈G〉φ iff there is a ﬁnite sequence of announcements by agents in G after which φ is true.
In Section 7 we discuss a security protocol example involving sequences of announcements. Note that our result does
not mean that sequences of announcements can simply be replaced by a single announcement: whether agents are willing
to do an announcement may depend on the postconditions of such announcements. These may be known to be satisﬁed after
each announcement in the sequence, but not known to be satisﬁed initially after the entire sequence. These matters will be
discussed in great detail later.
3.3.3. Church–Rosser
We prove that for all groups G and H of agents, for every formula φ ∈ Lgal , 〈G〉[H]φ → [H]〈G〉φ is a valid formula.
The principle is fairly intuitive: it says that when in a given epistemic state group G or group H make a group announce-
ment, there are additional announcements by group H (after G ’s announcement) and group G (after H ’s announcement),
in order to reach a new common state of information. Unfortunately, its proof is rather involved. This is because group
announcements implicitly quantify over all propositional variables in the language. Towards the proof, we ﬁrst deﬁne the
group-announcement depth d(φ) of a formula φ:
Let p ∈ Θ , ψ,ψ1,ψ2 ∈ Lgal , i ∈ N , and G ⊆ N be given; then d(p) = 0; d(¬ψ) = d(Kiψ) = d(ψ); d(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) =
d([ψ1]ψ2) = max(d(ψ1),d(ψ2)); and d([G]ψ) = d(ψ) + 1. The following lemma holds for any number k, but we will only
use it for k |N|.
Lemma 8. Let Q = {qi}i∈N ⊆ Θ be pairwise distinct primitive propositions, and, for some k ∈ N, θ1, . . . , θk be epistemic formulas
such that for i = 1 to i = k, Θθi ∩ Q = ∅, and let φ ∈ Lgal be such that Θφ ∩ Q = ∅.
For all ψ ∈ Lgal, deﬁne{
ψα = ψ(θ1/q1, . . . , θk/qk,q1/qk+1,q2/qk+2, . . .)
ψ−α = ψ(qk+1/q1,qk+2/q2, . . .)
Then, for all structures M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) there is a valuation function V ′ :Θ → 2S such that
1. φαM = φM′ ,
2. for all ψ ∈ Lel,
• ψM′ = ψαM ,
• ψM = ψ−αM′ ,
3. for all i  k,qiM′ = θiM′ = θiM ,
where M′ = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ′).
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V ′(p) = V (p), for all p /∈ Q ,
V ′(qi) = θiM′ , for all i  k,
V ′(qk+i) = V (qi), for all i  1.
Items 2 and 3 follow directly from the deﬁnition of V ′ . We prove item 1 by induction on the group-announcement depth
of φ, by showing the somewhat stronger:
For all subformulas φ∗ of φ, for all submodels M∗ of M, and for all states s ∈ M∗: M∗, s | φα∗ iff M′∗, s | φ∗ .
Base case main induction: The base case of this proof shows that this holds for all formulas without group announcement
operators. This is itself a proof by induction on the structure of φ. We proceed:
Base case: φ = p ∈ Θ . Then the equivalence M∗, s | pα iff M′∗, s | p follows directly from the deﬁnition of V ′ and α.
Inductive cases: Let us suppose that the property is true for all subformulas of ψ , ψ1 and ψ2, and let us prove it for
¬ψ,ψ1 ∧ψ2, Kˆ iψ and [ψ1]ψ2:
• ¬ψ :
M∗, s | (¬ψ)α iff M∗, s | ¬ψα iff M∗, s | ψα iff (by IH) M′∗, s | ψ iff M′∗, s | ¬ψ .• ψ1 ∧ψ2:
M∗, s | (ψ1 ∧ψ2)α iff M∗, s | ψα1 ∧ψα2 iff (M∗, s | ψα1 and M∗, s | ψα2 ) iff (by IH) (M′∗, s | ψ1) and M′∗, s | ψ2)
iff M′∗, s | ψ1 ∧ψ2.• Kiψ :
M∗, s | Kiψα iff for all t ∼i s, M∗, t | ψα iff for all t ∼i s, M′∗, t | ψ (by IH) iff (as ∼i = ∼′i ) for all t ∼′i s, M′∗, t | ψ
iff M′∗, s | Kiψ .• [ψ1]ψ2:
M∗, s | ([ψ1]ψ2)α iff M∗, s | [ψα1 ]ψα2 iff (M∗, s | ψα1 implies M∗|ψα1 , s | ψα2 ) iff (using IH twice) (M′∗, s | ψ1
implies (M∗|ψα1 )′, s | ψ2) iff (using IH again for ψα1 and ψ1, and that V ′ on the restriction is the restriction of V ′)
(M′∗, s | ψ1 implies M′∗|ψ1, s | ψ2) iff M′∗, s | [ψ1]ψ2.
Inductive case main induction: It remains to show the inductive case of the original induction on group-announcement
operator depth. Suppose the property is true for all ψ such that d(ψ) n. We prove that it is true for φ = 〈G〉ψ .
M∗, s | (〈G〉ψ)α
iff
M∗, s | 〈G〉ψα
iff
there are χ1, . . . ,χ|G| in Lel such that M∗, s | 〈
∧
Kiχi〉ψα
iff (∗∗)
there are χ1, . . . ,χ|G| in Lel such that M∗, s | 〈(
∧
Kiχ
−α
i )
α〉ψα
iff (IH on depth)
there are χ1, . . . ,χ|G| in Lel such that M′∗, s | 〈
∧
Kiχ
−α
i 〉ψ
iff
M′∗, s | 〈G〉ψ.
In (∗∗) we have used (the already shown) property 2 for epistemic formulas from which also follows that for all such
ψ : (ψ−α)α = ψ . 
Proposition 9 (Diamond lemma). Let k 0 and G = {i1, . . . , ik} be a set of agents. If M, s | 〈G〉ψ and p1, . . . , pk /∈ Θψ , then there
is an M′′ different from M only on the valuation of the atoms not appearing in ψ such that M′′, s | 〈Ki1 p1 ∧ · · · ∧ Kik pk〉ψ .
Proof. We use the previous lemma twice:
1. Let Q be Θ\Θψ and qi be pi for all i  k, θi be  for all i  k and φ be 〈G〉ψ . By Lemma 8, there is V ′ such that
V ′(pi) = S and 〈G〉ψM′ = 〈G〉ψM . As M, s | 〈G〉ψ , we have that M′, s | 〈G〉ψ . Therefore there are τ1, . . . , τk in
Lel such that M′, s | 〈
∧
i∈G Kiτi〉ψ .
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there is V ′′ such that (with M′′ as M except for valuation V ′′) 〈∧ Kiτi〉ψM′′ = 〈∧ Kiτi〉ψM′ and for all i  k,
piM′′ = τiM′′ = τiM′ . This last property implies that M′′ |∧ Ki pi ↔∧ Kiτi . As M′, s | 〈∧i∈G Kiτi〉ψ (by the
ﬁrst item), the ﬁrst property implies that M′′, s | 〈∧i∈G Kiτi〉ψ . The second one implies that M′′ |∧ Ki pi ↔∧ Kiτi .
We now have that M′′, s | 〈∧i∈G Ki pi〉ψ . 
A generalization of Proposition 9 indirectly proves the soundness of a derivation rule in the axiomatization of GAL. Here,
we need Proposition 9 to prove the validity of the generalized Church–Rosser schema.
Proposition 10 (Church–Rosser generalized). For any G, H ⊆ N: | 〈G〉[H]φ → [H]〈G〉φ .
Proof. Suppose the contrary: Let M be a model, s a state of M, φ ∈ Lgal and G, H ⊆ N two groups of agents such that
M, s | 〈G〉[H]φ ∧ 〈H〉[G]¬φ. Then, using Proposition 9 twice, for |G| = k and |H| = k′ , we know that there are {pi}i∈G and
{qi}i∈H subsets of Θ and M′ differing from M only on the valuation of the pi,qi such that
M′, s |
〈 ∧
i∈G
Ki pi
〉
[H]φ ∧
〈 ∧
i∈H
Kiqi
〉
[G]¬φ.
In particular,
M′, s |
〈 ∧
i∈G
Ki pi
〉[ ∧
i∈H
Kiqi
]
φ ∧
〈 ∧
i∈H
Kiqi
〉[ ∧
i∈G
Ki pi
]
¬φ.
Note that 〈∧i∈G Ki pi〉 and 〈∧i∈H Kiqi〉 are conjunctions of known facts. As these are positive formulas, they remain true
after further announcements. So we have
M′, s |
〈 ∧
i∈G
Ki pi ∧
∧
i∈H
Kiqi
〉
φ ∧
〈 ∧
i∈G
Ki pi ∧
∧
i∈H
Kiqi
〉
¬φ
from which directly follows a contradiction. 
Corollary 11 (Church–Rosser). | 〈G〉[G]φ → [G]〈G〉φ .
We cannot in general reverse the order of G and H in Proposition 10. A simple counterexample is the following model,
where b cannot distinguish between two states but a can.
0•p b 1•¬p
We now have that M,0 | 〈a〉[b]Kbp∧〈a〉[b]¬Kbp because M,0 | 〈Kap〉[b]Kbp∧〈Ka〉[b]¬Kbp. Therefore 〈G〉[H]φ →
[G]〈H〉φ is not valid if G = {a} and H = {b}.
3.3.4. More validities
Just as for Church–Rosser, one would like to know whether the APAL validity φ → φ has a GAL generalization.
We know that there exists G, H ⊆ N such that the schema [G]〈H〉φ → 〈H〉[G]φ is not valid. A simple counterexample is the
following model M, i.e. for G = {a} and H = {b}, with φ = (KaKbp ∨ KbKaq)∧ ¬(KaKbp ∧ KbKaq).
•p,q11 a
b
•¬p,q01
b
•p,¬q10 a •¬p,¬q00
Here we have M,11 | [a]〈b〉φ ∧ [b]〈a〉¬φ. We do not know whether [G]〈G〉φ → 〈G〉[G]φ is valid.
For arbitrary announcement logic we have that Kiφ →Kiφ, but not the other way round. Now, we can do more.
Proposition 12. For arbitrary i ∈ N and G ⊆ N:
1. | Ki[i]φ ↔ [i]Kiφ .
2. | Ki[G]φ → [G]Kiφ (but not the other way round).
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1. In APAL, Kiφ → Kiφ is false because after going to an i-accessible state the subsequent model restriction may exclude
the actual state. But for singleton announcements we have an equivalence. This is because any i-accessible state will be
contained in the actual i-class.
2. As for arbitrary announcement logic. Agent i may but need not be in group G . 
Finally, a rather puzzling property on the interaction between the announcements and knowledge by two agents. The
intuition behind it, is that announcements wherein you can make another agent learn facts even in the face of your own
uncertainty, are rather rare. In other words, the conditions in the equivalence are fairly strong.
Proposition 13. For any atomic proposition p ∈ Θ: | 〈a〉Kbp ↔ 〈b〉Kap.
Proof. Assume M, s | 〈a〉Kbp. Then there is a ψa ∈ Lel such that M, s | 〈Kaψa〉Kbp. This formula is equivalent to Kaψa ∧
(Kaψa → Kb[Kaψa]p) and thus to Kaψa ∧ Kb(Kaψa → p) – as p is an atom. Let us note M′ = M|Kb(Kaψa → p) and let us
proof that M′, s | Kap. Indeed, let t ∈ M′ s.t. t ∈ R′a(x) (in the restricted model) and let us prove that M′, t | p. But we
have (1) M, t | Kb(Kaψa → p) and (2) t ∈ Ra(x) (in the non-restricted model). But (1) implies that M, t | Kaψa → p and
(2) implies that M, t | Kaψa (because M, s | Kaψa). Then M, t | p, and thus M′, t | p. 
We now proceed to a more systematic treatment of validities.
3.4. Axiomatization
The following is a sound and complete axiomatization of group announcement logic.
Deﬁnition 14 (GAL axioms and rules).
Instantiations of propositional tautologies
Ki(φ → ψ) → (Kiφ → Kiψ) distribution (of knowl. over impl.)
Kiφ → φ truth
Kiφ → Ki Kiφ positive introspection
¬Kiφ → Ki¬Kiφ negative introspection
[φ]p ↔ (φ → p) atomic permanence
[φ]¬ψ ↔ (φ → ¬[φ]ψ) announcement and negation
[φ](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ ([φ]ψ ∧ [φ]χ) announcement and conjunction
[φ]Kiψ ↔ (φ → Ki[φ]ψ) announcement and knowledge
[φ][ψ]χ ↔ [φ ∧ [φ]ψ]χ announcement composition
[G]φ → [∧i∈G Kiψi]φ, where ψi ∈ Lel group and speciﬁc announcement
From φ and φ → ψ, infer ψ modus ponens
From φ, infer Kiφ necessitation of knowledge
From φ, infer [ψ]φ necessitation of announcement
From φ, infer [G]φ necessitation of group announcement
From φ → [θ][∧i∈G Ki pi]ψ, infer φ → [θ][G]ψ deriving group announcement/R([G])
where pi /∈ Θφ ∪Θθ ∪Θψ
Our axiomatization of GAL is based on the standard S5 axioms for the epistemic operators Ki , the standard reduction
axioms for the public announcement operators [φ], and some additional axioms and derivation rules involving group an-
nouncement operators. These are the axiom group and speciﬁc announcement, and the derivation rules necessitation of group
announcement and deriving group announcement. A formula φ ∈ Lgal is derivable, notation  φ, iff φ belongs to the least set
of formulas containing GAL axioms and closed with respect to the derivation rules.
The axiom [G]φ → [∧i∈G Kiψi]φ, where ψi ∈ Lel , is obviously valid in all structures. Also the validity of ‘from φ, infer[G]φ’ will be obvious. The derivation rule deriving group announcement (R([G])) is used to introduce group announcement
operators in derivations:
From φ → [θ][∧i∈G Ki pi]ψ (where pi /∈ Θφ ∪Θθ ∪Θψ ) infer φ → [θ][G]ψ .
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taining an empty slot, in a way that the subformula does not appear just behind a negation, or similar awkward positions.
We write η(χ) for that formula η with the empty slot ﬁlled. The following is then the intuitively valid derivation rule that
we need:
From η([∧i∈G Kiψi]ψ) for all ψi ∈ Lel , infer η([G]ψ).
In other words, if you can get ψ after no matter what simultaneous announcement by no matter what agent in G , then
it holds after group announcements by G . In the following section we show why this formulation can be simpliﬁed to
the rule deriving group announcement, and why therefore our rule is sound. An outline of the completeness proof of GAL is
also presented in the following section. The details for soundness and completeness are very similar to those for arbitrary
announcement logic in [4,5].
Theorem 15 (Soundness and completeness). Let φ ∈ Lgal. Then φ is a theorem iff φ is valid.
3.4.1. Soundness and completeness
We show soundness of the rule R([G]), and we outline how the soundness and completeness proofs are interlinked. The
completeness part of the proof uses the notion of necessity forms. it is very similar to the one for arbitrary announcement
logic. For full details, see [5].
Necessity forms were introduced by Goldblatt [11]. A necessity form contains a unique occurrence of a special symbol .
If ψ is such a necessity form and φ ∈ Lgal , then ψ(φ) is obtained from ψ by substituting  in ψ for φ. The necessity forms
are inductively deﬁned as follows:  is a necessity form; if ψ is a necessity form then (φ → ψ) is a necessity form; if ψ is
a necessity form and ϕ is in Lgal then [φ]ψ is a necessity form; if ψ is a necessity form then Kiψ is a necessity form. We
also use the dual notion of possibility form which can be deﬁned by the dual clauses to a necessity form:  is a possibility
form; if ψ is a possibility form then (φ ∧ψ ), 〈φ〉ψ and Kˆ iψ are possibility forms.
First, we prove a generalization of Proposition 9:
Lemma 16. Let n  0 and G = {i1, . . . , in} be a set of agents. Let η() be a possibility form. If M, s | η{〈G〉ψ} and p1, . . . , pn /∈
Θη ∪Θψ then there is an M′ differing only on the valuation of the pi such that M′, s | η{〈∧i∈G Ki pi〉ψ}.
Proof. The base case where η = , such that η{〈G〉ψ} = 〈G〉ψ , has been proved by Proposition 9. For the inductive cases:
let η{} be a possibility form and suppose that the conditions for M, s | η{〈G〉ψ} are met, and let φ ∈ Lgal . Then:
• If M, s | φ∧η{〈G〉ψ} and p1, . . . , pn /∈ Θη ∪Θψ ∪Θφ , then the construction made in the proof of Proposition 9 applies
here too and gives us that M′, s | φ, and then, by IH, M′, s | φ ∧ η{〈∧i∈G Ki pi〉ψ}.• If M, s | 〈φ〉η{〈G〉ψ} and p1, . . . , pn /∈ Θη ∪Θψ ∪Θφ then M|φ, s | η{〈G〉ψ} and by induction hypothesis (M|φ)′, s |
η{〈∧i∈G Ki pi〉ψ}. By deﬁnition of the valuation V ′ , (M|φ)′ = M′|φ.
• If M, s | Kˆ iη{〈G〉ψ}, then there is a t such that s ∼i t and M, t | η{〈G〉ψ}. Then, by IH, M′, t | η{〈∧i∈G Ki pi〉ψ}. But
we also have that s ∼′i t by construction of M′ . 
This lemma will help us to show soundness of the rule R([G]) in the axiomatization. Consider two variants of the
axiomatization GAL, with instead of R([G]) either rule Rω([G]) or rule R1([G]) as follows (where ϕ is an arbitrary necessity
form):
• From ϕ([∧i∈G Kiθi]ψ) for all {θi}i∈G ⊂ Lel , infer ϕ([G]ψ) (Rω([G]))
• From ϕ([∧i∈G Ki pi]ψ) where pi /∈ Θϕ ∪Θψ , infer ϕ([G]ψ) (R1([G]))
The inference rule Rω([G]) is not ﬁnitary, but its soundness is very obvious. The rule R1([G]) is ﬁnitary (one premiss!),
its soundness is not obvious, but fortunately it follows directly from Lemma 16. Here comes the convenient truth: the rule
R1([G]) is stronger than the rule Rω([G]): if, in the system based on Rω([G]), we can prove ϕ([∧ Kiθi]ψ) for all epistemic
formulas θi then we can prove in particular ϕ([∧ Ki pi]ψ) for some atoms p1, . . . , pk /∈ Θϕ ∪Θψ . As a result, we can derive
the conclusion of the inﬁnitary rule using only the ﬁnitary rule. Therefore, anything derivable in the inﬁnitary axiomatization
is also derivable in the axiomatization with R1([G]).
One can also show that R1([G]) and R([G]) are equally strong, in the sense that every derivation using the former can
be transformed in one using the latter. The occurrence of [∧i∈G Ki pi]ψ in the necessity form is always the last subformula
(see the deﬁnition), but it can be preceded by any wild sequence of implications, epistemic operators, and announcement
operators. All these can be pushed and merged such that the main operator becomes an implication, with as main operator
on the right-hand side an announcement (for a proof, see [5] – the proof does not use that formulas may have arbitrary
announcement operators):
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This lemma indirectly shows the soundness of the derivation rule R([G]).
The omitted completeness proof demonstrates that all validities are derivable in the inﬁnitary axiomatization, with the
rule Rω([G]), and that then closes the circle, i.e.: if a formula is valid, we ﬁnd an inﬁnitary derivation, by just keeping the
one premiss we get a ﬁnitary derivation (that can be transformed into one using the R([G]) version of the ﬁnitary rule
R1([G])), and soundness of that principle gives us validity again. See [5] for details.
4. Expressivity
Given languages X and Y and a model class Z , X is at least as expressive as Y with respect to Z iff, for every X-formula
φ there is a logically equivalent Y -formula ψ . In other words, for every Z -model M, φM = ψM: the denotation of
φ in M with respect to the X-semantics is the same as the denotation of ψ in M with respect to the Y -semantics. Two
standard ways to determine that X is at least as expressive as Y are: the Y -formulas are a sublanguage of the X-formulas (i);
there is a translation (reduction) such that every Y -formula is logically equivalent to an X formula (ii). Logic X is more
expressive than Y with respect to Z if X is at least as expressive as Y , but Y is not at least as expressive as X (the notion
is a partial order). The standard way to determine that Y is not at least as expressive as X is, that there are an X-formula
φ and two Z -models (M, s) and (M′, s′) such that φ is true in (M, s) and false in (M′, s′), but any Y -formula ψ is true
in (M, s) iff ψ is true in (M′, s′). We then also say that the logic X , but not Y , can distinguish between the models (M, s)
and (M′, s′).
Known results are that EL is equally expressive as PAL [17], that in the single-agent situation APAL is equally expressive
as PAL, and that in the multi-agent situation APAL is more expressive than PAL [4]. In this section we demonstrate that in
the single-agent situation GAL is equally expressive as EL, and that in the multi-agent situation GAL is more expressive than
EL, and GAL is not more expressive than APAL. We conjecture that APAL is not as least as expressive as (multi-agent) GAL.
Proposition 18. For a single agent GAL is equally expressive as EL and PAL.
Proof. Let a be the unique agent. For all φ in GAL we have that | [a]φ ↔ φ, because in the single agent situation,
each model is bisimilar to the restriction of that model to the a-equivalence class, from which directly follows that
| [a]φ ↔ φ. 
Theorem 19. If n 2, then GAL is more expressive than EL and PAL.
Proof. GAL is obviously at least as expressive as EL. For the strictness part, consider the formula 〈b〉Kap. Assume that there
is an EL formula ψ equivalent to 〈b〉Kap. Formula ψ can only contain a ﬁnite number of atoms. Let q be an atom not
occurring in ψ . Consider the following models M and M′ where a and b have common knowledge of their ignorance of p.
M: •p1
a,b •¬p0
M′: •p,q11 a
b
•¬p,¬q00
b
•¬p,q01 a •p,¬q10
It is easy to see that M,1 | 〈b〉Kap, but that M′,11 | 〈Kbq〉Kap, and thus that M′,11 | 〈b〉Kap. On the other hand,
(M,1) and (M′,11) are bisimilar with respect to the epistemic language not including atom q, thus ψ cannot distinguish
between these two pointed models. Therefore, ψ cannot be equivalent to 〈b〉Kap. 
Theorem 20. GAL is not at least as expressive as APAL.
Proof. Consider the APAL formula (Kap∧¬KbKap), and suppose there is an equivalent GAL formula χ . Assume an atomic
proposition q not occurring in χ . We prove that the below pointed models (M,10) and (Ma,10) cannot be distinguished
by any GAL-formula χ , whereas (Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) is true in the former but false in the latter, thus again deriving a
contradiction.
The crucial insight is that in GAL, unlike in APAL, the only deﬁnable model restrictions of M,10 are the four below
displayed models. And to make the formula (Kap∧¬KbKap) true in M,10, one needs to be able to deﬁne the restriction
with domain {11,10,00}. The formal proof is by induction on the structure of ψ , and is formulated in terms also involving
other points of other model restrictions of M; of that proof we only give the formal proposition and for state 10 the
inductive cases for announcement and for group announcement.
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b
•¬p,q01
b
•p,¬q10 a •¬p,¬q00
Mb: •p,q11
b
•p,¬q10
Ma: 10•p,¬q a 00•¬p,¬q Mab: 10•p,¬q
Let ψ ∈ Lgal with q /∈ Θψ . Then:
M,10 | ψ ⇔ Ma,10 | ψ ⇔ M,11 | ψ (i)
Mab,10 | ψ ⇔ Mb,10 | ψ ⇔ Mb,11 | ψ (ii)
M,00 | ψ ⇔ Ma,00 | ψ ⇔ M,01 | ψ (iii)
Inductive case announcement:
• M,10 | [χ ]ψ
iff M,10 | χ implies M|χ,10 | ψ (∗)
iff M,10 | χ implies
{M,10 | ψ if M,00 | χ
Mb,10 | ψ otherwise
iff Ma,10 | χ implies
{Ma,10 | ψ if M,00 | χ
Mab,10 | ψ otherwise (∗∗)
iff Ma,10 | χ implies Ma|χ,10 | ψ
iff Ma,10 | [χ ]ψ.
(∗): By induction hypothesis: M|χ = M if M,00 | χ , and M|χ = Mb otherwise.
(∗∗): By induction hypothesis: Ma|χ = Ma if Ma,00 | χ , and Ma|χ = Mab otherwise.
Inductive case group announcement (there are four different coalitions):
• M,10 | [∅]ψ
iff M,10 | ψ
• M,10 | [a]ψ
iff M,10 | ψ and Ma,10 | ψ
iff Ma,10 | ψ (by IH)
iff Ma,10 | [a]ψ
• M,10 | [b]ψ
iff M,10 | ψ and Mb,10 | ψ
iff Ma,10 | ψ and Mab,10 | ψ (by IH)
iff Ma,10 | [b]ψ
• M,10 | [a,b]ψ
iff M,10 | ψ and Ma,10 | ψ and Mab,10 | ψ and Mb,10 | ψ
iff Ma,10 | ψ and Mab,10 | ψ (by IH)
iff Ma,10 | [a,b]ψ . 
Conjecture 21. APAL is not at least as expressive as GAL.
Thus, we conjecture that the two logics are incomparable when it comes to expressivity.
Now consider a very special model class Mg , namely the class where an agent g has the identity relation on all models
(there may be other agents). It is clear that the announcement made by g has the property that Kgφ ↔ φ: everything is
known by g . Therefore φ in APAL is equivalent to 〈g〉φ in GAL (ignoring a further translation downward in φ). If we restrict
the model class of the logic to Mg , we say that a super agent g exists. This makes clear that:
Proposition 22. If a super agent g exists, GAL is at least as expressive as APAL.
Proof. Given a φ ∈ Lapal , replace every occurrence of  in φ by [g]. The resulting formula is in Lgal . 
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If a given system can be modeled as a ﬁnite model, one would like to verify if a given property written in a language
for specifying desired properties of systems holds in the ﬁnite model. We speak of the model checking problem, an area
of automated deduction that has been addressed for almost all logical languages, for example modal logic [12], temporal
logic [10], etc. There is a need, on the theoretical side, to provide a sound mathematical basis for the design of algorithms
devoted to the model checking problem. Hence, the question arises whether the following decision problem is decidable:
input: A ﬁnite structure M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ), a state x ∈ S and a formula φ ∈ Lgal ,
output: Determine whether φ is satisﬁed at x in M.
This decision problem, denoted (MC(GAL)) is a variant of the well-known model checking problem. If one restricts to for-
mulas φ ∈ Lel , then the above decision problem is known to be P -complete. The notion of a formula like [{1, . . . ,n}]φ being
satisﬁed in a structure M = (S,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ) at state x ∈ S relies on the satisﬁability of all (inﬁnitely many) formulas like
[K1ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ Knϕn]φ at x where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Lel . In Theorem 24 we show that (MC(GAL)) is in PSPACE and in Theorem 25
we show that it is PSPACE-hard.
5.1. Preliminary results
Let ZM be the greatest bisimulation relation on M. Note that ZM is an equivalence relation on S . For all s ∈ S , let ‖s‖
be the equivalence class of s modulo ZM . The bisimulation contraction of M is the structure ‖M‖ = (S ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′)
such that:
• S ′ = S|ZM , i.e. the quotient of S modulo ZM ,• ‖s‖ ∼′i ‖t‖ iff there exist v,w ∈ S such that sZMv , t ZMw and v ∼i w ,• V ′(p) = V (p)|ZM .
The following proposition will be obvious, because:
• the bisimulation contraction is bisimilar to the original structure;
• bisimilar structures have the same logical theory [6];
• public announcement and group announcement are bisimulation preserving operations.
Proposition 23. For all φ ∈ Lgal,‖M‖,‖x‖ | φ iff M, x | φ .
In ‖M‖ = (S ′,∼′1, . . . ,∼′n, V ′), every ‖s‖ ∈ S ′ can be distinguished by a pure epistemic formula from all other (non-
bisimilar) states. Hence, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, each union C′i of classes of equivalence for ∼′i is distinguished from all
other (non-bisimilar) states by a pure epistemic formula of the form Kiφi . Therefore, a pure epistemic formula of the form∧
i∈G Kiφi deﬁnes a restriction M′′ = (S ′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n, V ′′) where S ′′ =
⋂
i∈G C′i .
5.2. Model checking algorithm
Theorem 24. (MC(GAL)) is in PSPACE.
Proof. Since APTIME = PSPACE [9], it suﬃces to prove that (MC(GAL)) is in APTIME. Let us consider the alternating Algo-
rithm 1. This algorithm takes as input a ﬁnite model M, a state s in M, a formula ϕ in Lgal and b in {0,1}. It stops with a
reject iff either b = 0 and M, s | ϕ or b = 1 and M, s | ϕ whereas it stops with an accept iff either b = 0 and M, s | ϕ
or b = 1 and M, s | ϕ . Its execution depends primarily on (ϕ,b). Each case is either existential or universal. For example,
the case (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2,1) is existential. It is an accepting case iff for some ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1,ϕ2}, the case (ϕ′,1) is accepting, thus cor-
responding to the fact that ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 is true at s in M iff for some ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1,ϕ2}, ϕ′ is true at s in M. As well, the case
(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2,0) is universal. It is an accepting case iff for every ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1,ϕ2}, the case (ϕ′,0) is accepting, thus corresponding
to the fact that ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 is false at s in M iff for every ϕ′ ∈ {ϕ1,ϕ2}, ϕ′ is false at s in M. Cases labelled with (·) are both
existential and universal. Obviously,
• sat(M, s, φ,1) accepts iff M, s | φ,
• sat(M, s, φ,1) rejects iff M, s | φ,
• sat(M, s, φ,0) accepts iff M, s | φ,
• sat(M, s, φ,0) rejects iff M, s | φ.
The only diﬃcult case is ([G]φ,1). Computing ‖M‖ is easy and by Proposition 23 we have that M, s | 〈G〉φ iff ‖M‖,‖s‖ |
〈G〉φ. Then we just have to prove it in the case where ‖M‖ = M. Let us suppose it, and let us see that, if there is a deﬁnable
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case (φ,b) of
(·) (p,1): if s ∈ V (p) then accept else reject;
(·) (p,0): if s ∈ V (p) then reject else accept;
(·) (⊥,1): reject;
(·) (⊥,0): accept;
(·) (¬φ′,1): sat(M, s, φ′,0);
(·) (¬φ′,0): sat(M, s, φ′,1);
(∃) (φ1 ∨ φ2,1): choose φ′ ∈ {φ1, φ2}; sat(M, s, φ′,1);
(∀) (φ1 ∨ φ2,0): choose φ′ ∈ {φ1, φ2}; sat(M, s, φ′,0);
(∀) (Kiφ′,1): choose t ∈∼i (s); sat(M, t, φ′,1);
(∃) (Kiφ′,0): choose t ∈∼i (x); sat(M, t, φ′,0);
(·) ([φ1]φ2,1): compute the φ1-deﬁnable restriction M′ = (S ′,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ′) of M;
if s ∈ S ′ then sat(M′, s, φ2,1) else accept;
(·) ([φ1]φ2,0): compute the φ1-deﬁnable restriction M′ = (S ′,∼1, . . . ,∼n, V ′) of M;
if s ∈ S ′ then sat(M′, s, φ2,0) else reject;
(∀) ([G]φ,1): Compute ‖M‖, choose a deﬁnable restriction M′′ = (S ′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n , V ′′)
of ‖M‖ s.t. S ′′ =⋂i∈G Ci where Ci are unions of classes of equivalence for ∼′i ;
if s ∈ S ′′ then sat(M′′, s, φ,1) else accept;
(∃) ([G]φ,0): Compute ‖M‖, choose a deﬁnable restriction M′′ = (S ′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n , V ′′)
of ‖M‖ s.t. S ′′ =⋂i∈G Ci where Ci are unions of classes of equivalence for ∼′i ;
if s ∈ S ′′ then sat(M′′, s, φ,0) else reject;
end case
restriction M′′ = (S ′′,∼′′1, . . . ,∼′′n, V ′) of M such that S ′′ =
⋂
i∈G Ci where Ci are unions of classes of equivalence for ∼i , if
also s ∈ S ′′ and M′, s | φ, then M, s | 〈G〉φ. Let us then suppose the ﬁrst part of the implication.
M is supposed to be bisimulation-contracted, then we know that for all s ∈ M, there is φs ∈ Lgal , s.t. for all t ∈ M,
M, t | φs iff s = t . It implies that s ∈ S ′′ iff (for all i ∈ G , s ∈ Ci) iff M, s |∧i∈G(∨t∈Ci φt) which is equivalent to M, s |∧
i∈G Ki(
∨
t∈Ci φt). That means that M′′ = M|
∧
i∈G Ki(
∨
t∈Ci φt) and then M, s | 〈
∧
i∈G Ki(
∨
t∈Ci φt)〉φ (because s ∈ S ′′
and M′, s | φ). We obtain M, s | 〈G〉φ.
Since sat can be implemented in polynomial time, (MC(GAL)) is in APTIME. 
Theorem 25. (MC(GAL)) is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. We prove that (MC(GAL)) is PSPACE-hard. Let Ψ = Q 1x1 . . . QkxkΦ(x1, . . . , xk) be an entry of the problem QBF-SAT:
• Q 1, . . . , Qk ∈ {∀,∃},
• x1, . . . , xk are Boolean variables,
• Φ(x1, . . . , xk) is a Boolean formula.
We will associate to Ψ a model M1;k = (W1;k,R1, . . . ,Rk, V ), a world x ∈ Wk and a formula ψ(Ψ ) ∈ Lgal such that
| Ψ iff M1;k, x | ψ(Ψ ) (Pk).
Let 1  m  k, Wm;k = {x} ∪ {(xl,0), (xl,1)}l∈{m,...,k} be the set of possible worlds, {p−m, p+m, . . . , p−k , p+k } be the set of
atoms, with V (p−l ) = {(xl,0)} and V (p+l ) = {(xl,1)}.
Let i, g ∈ N and let us deﬁne{Ri = Wm;k × Wm;k,
Rg = {(s, s) such that s ∈ Wm;k}.
(Note that g is omniscient and that i assumes this fact.)
M1;k: p−1 •(x1,0)
i
i p−2 •(x2,0)
i
i
(. . .)
i p−k •(xk,0)
i
x•i
i
p+1 •(x1,1) i p+2 •(x2,1) i (. . .) i p+k •(xk,1)
(Note that i’s relation is reﬂexive, symmetrical and transitive, and that g ’s reﬂexive arrows are omitted.)
Let us now deﬁne some formulae:
for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, ql = Kˆ i(p−l ∧ Ki¬p+l )∨ Kˆ i(p+l ∧ Ki¬p−l ) and rl = Kˆ i p+l ∧ Kˆ i p−l .
Intuitively, M1,k | rl means that (xl,0) and (xl,1) are still possible worlds of the model (i.e. the truth value of xl is not
ﬁxed) and M1,k | ql means that one and only one of (xl,0) and (xl,1) is still a possible world (i.e. we have ﬁxed the value
of xl).
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Let ψ0 = Φ(Kˆ i p+1 , . . . , Kˆ i p+k ), suppose ψl is deﬁned for some l < k, then
ψl+1 =
{
Ki[g](q1 ∧ · · · ∧ qk−l ∧ rk−l+1 ∧ · · · ∧ rk → ψl) if Ql+1 = ∀,
Kˆ i〈g〉(q1 ∧ · · · ∧ qk−l ∧ rk−l+1 ∧ · · · ∧ rk ∧ψl) if Ql+1 = ∃.
Finally, ψ(Ψ ) = ψk .
Example. If Ψ = ∀x1,∃x2,∀x3,Φ(x1, x2, x3) then:
ψ(Ψ ) = Ki[g]
(
q1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3 → Kˆ i〈g〉
(
q1 ∧ q2 ∧ r3
∧ Ki[g]
(
q1 ∧ q2 ∧ q3 → Φ
(
Kˆ i p
+
1 , . . . , Kˆ i p
+
k
))))
.
Intuitively, Ki[g](q1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3 → φ) means “After having ﬁxed the value of x1 only, φ” and Kˆ i〈g〉(q1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3 ∧ φ) as “There
is a way of ﬁxing the value of x1 only, such that φ”. We can now prove | Ψ ⇔ M1;k, x | ψ(Ψ ) by induction on k. The
induction is quite technical, but the intuition is that something is true after having ﬁxed the value of k+1 boolean variables
if and only if it is true after having ﬁxed the value of the ﬁrst k variables, added the ﬁnal one and then ﬁxed its value. More
precisely:
Base case: k = 1:
Ψ = Q 1x1Φ(x1), and M1: p−1 •(x1,0)
i
x•i
p+1 •(x1,1)
i
• If Q 1 = ∀ then | Ψ iff (| Φ() and | Φ(⊥)) iff (| Φ() ↔  and | Φ(⊥) ↔ )
iff ( p+1 • i •x | Φ(Kˆ i p+1 ) and p−1 • i •x | Φ(Kˆ i p+1 ))
iff M1, x | Ki[g](q1 → Φ(Kˆ i p+1 )), i.e. M1, x | ψ(Ψ )• Else, Q 1 = ∃ and | Ψ iff (| Φ()∨Φ(⊥)) iff (| Φ() ↔  or | Φ(⊥) ↔ )
iff ( p+1 • i •x | Φ(Kˆ i p+1 ) or p−1 • i •x | Φ(Kˆ i p+1 ))
iff M1, x | Kˆ i〈g〉(q1 ∧Φ(Kˆ i p+1 )) i.e. M1, x | ψ(Ψ )
Inductive case: k → k + 1:
Suppose that (Pk) is true, and let us note: Ψ = Q 1x1 . . . QkxkQk+1xk+1Φ(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1).
Then we have: | Ψ ⇔| Q 1x1 Q 2x2 . . . QkxkQk+1xk+1Φ(x1, . . . , xk, xk+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ˜ (x1)
• If Q 1 = ∀ then | Ψ iff (| Ψ˜ () and | Ψ˜ (⊥))
iff M2;k+1, x | ψ(Ψ˜ ()) and M2;k+1, x | ψ(Ψ˜ (⊥)) (by IH)
iff M1;k+1, x | Ki[g](q1 ∧ r2 ∧ · · · ∧ rk+1 → ψ∗(Ψ˜ (Kˆ i p+1 )))
with ψ∗ obtained by replacing any succession q2 ∧ · · · by q1 ∧ q2 ∧ · · ·
• If Q 1 = ∃ then | Ψ iff (| Ψ˜ () or | Ψ˜ (⊥))
iff M2;k+1, x | ψ(Ψ˜ ()) or M2;k+1, x | ψ(Ψ˜ (⊥)) (by IH)
iff M1;k+1, x | Kˆ i〈g〉(q1 ∧ r2 ∧ · · · ∧ rk+1 ∧ψ∗(Ψ˜ (Kˆ i p+1 )))
Agent g ’s announcement is just like a public announcement. Therefore, the same proof shows hat the model checking
for APAL is PSPACE hard, namely by replacing [g] by , and 〈g〉 by , above. 
We observe that our results also extend to APAL: the model checking problem for arbitrary public announcement logic is
also PSPACE-complete. A relevant detail in the proof of Theorem 25 is that it involves an omniscient agent g , and that the
role of [g] is in APAL played by , and that of 〈g〉 by . (See also the expressivity result involving g , Proposition 22.)
6. Announcements and ability
Our initial intuitive interpretation of a formula of the form 〈C〉φ was that coalition C has the ability to make φ come
about by making some public announcement. We now have a better understanding of group announcement logic; let us
discuss to what extent that intuition is precise.
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context of incomplete information [13,15,1,14] (see [14] for a recent summary). For example, does ability entail knowledge
of ability? In [14, p. 433] three levels of ability in general strategy logics are discussed. We now discuss counterparts of
these in the special context of truthful public announcements. In general strategy logics, such as atl or stit, agents and
coalitions can perform arbitrary state-transforming actions. In our setting the actions are truthful announcements, and there
is thus an intimate relationship between knowledge and ability. There are two main questions of interest related to the
mentioned different variants of ability here: are they indeed different in this special context, and are they expressible in the
logical language of GAL?
6.1. Singleton coalitions
For simplicity we ﬁrst consider a singleton coalition {a}. What does it mean that agent a has the ability to make a goal
φ come about by making a public announcement? Let us begin with the weakest form of ability.
Being able to, but not necessarily knowing it. The formula 〈a〉φ means that there is something which a knows, and if the
fact that a knows it is announced, φ is a consequence. However, it might be the case that a doesn’t know this, i.e., that Ka〈a〉φ
is not true. As an example, ﬁrst observe that 〈Kaψa〉φ → Ka〈Kaψa〉φ is not a principle of public announcement logic. As a
counterexample take state s of the following model
•ps a •¬pt
and take ψa =  and φ = p. However, this does not mean that a cannot achieve φ in all her accessible states by some other
announcements (possibly different ones in different states). But in group announcement logic, we have in the model above
that s | 〈a〉p (a can announce Ka), but t | 〈a〉p and thus, s | ¬Ka〈a〉p. So, 〈a〉φ → Ka〈a〉φ is not a principle of group
announcement logic. This is a ﬁrst illustration of the fact that we must be careful when using the term ‘ability’: in some
(but not necessarily all) circumstances it might be counter-intuitive to say that a has the ability make φ come about, when
she is not aware that she is; when she cannot discern between the actual situation and a situation in which she does not
have this ability.
Being able to, knowing that, but not knowing how. Consider the following model M (some model updates are also shown):
M: •¬p,qu
2
2
•p,¬qv 2 •p,qs 1 •p,qt
M|K1p: •p,¬qv 2 •p,qs 1 •p,qt M|K1q: •¬p,qu
2
•p,qs 1 •p,qt
and let
φ = K2q ∧
(¬K2p ∨ Kˆ1(K2p ∧ ¬K2q)).
If we take the current state to be s, we have a situation where 1 is able to make φ come about and where she in addition
knows this; a stronger type of ability than in the example above. Formally: s | 〈1〉φ, because s | 〈K1q〉φ, and t | 〈1〉φ
because t | 〈K1p〉φ. Thus, s | K1〈1〉φ. However, we argue, it might still be counter-intuitive to say that 1 can make φ
come about in this situation. The reason is that she has to use different announcements in indiscernible states. Observe that
s | 〈K1p〉¬φ and t | 〈K1q〉¬φ: while the same announcements can be made in both states, they don’t have the same
consequences. In fact, there exists no single announcement agent 1 can make which will ensure that φ will be true in both
s and t . To see this, we can enumerate the possible models resulting from 1 making an announcement in s or t . Because such
a model must include 1’s equivalence class {s, t}, there are four possibilities. First, the starting model itself (e.g., 1 announces
a tautology), in which φ does not hold in s. Second, the model where only state u is removed (e.g., 1 announces K1p), in
which φ does not hold in s (as we saw above). Third, the model where only state v is removed (e.g., 1 announces K1q),
in which φ does not hold in t (as we saw above). Fourth, the model where both u and v are removed, in which φ holds in
neither s nor t .
Since agent 1 cannot discern state s from state t , she has the ability to make φ come about only in the sense that she
depends on guessing the correct announcement. In other words, she can make φ come about, knows that she can make φ
come about, but does not know how to make φ come about.
Being able to, knowing that, knowing how. Thus, we can formulate a strong notion of the ability of a to achieve φ by public
announcements: there exists a formula ψ such that a knows ψ and in any state a considers possible, 〈Kaψ〉φ holds.
Compare this version of ability, “there is an announcement which a knows will achieve the goal”, with the previous
version above, “a knows that there is an announcement which will achieve the goal”. We can call these notions, respectively,
knowing de re and knowing de dicto that the goal can be achieved, following [15] who use the same terminology for general
strategy logics, after the corresponding notion used in quantiﬁed modal logic. In our framework these notions are more
formally deﬁned as follows:
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∀t ∼i s ∃ψ ∈ Lel (M, t) | 〈Kiψ〉φ. (1)
Knowledge de re: Agent i knows de re that she can achieve the goal φ in state s of model M iff
∃ψ ∈ Lel ∀t ∼i s (M, t) | 〈Kiψ〉φ. (2)
Note, however, that it is not prima facie clear that there is a distinction between these notions in GAL, because of the
intimate interaction between knowledge and possible actions (announcements), but the model and formula above show
that there indeed is.
We have seen how to express knowledge de dicto. In the most popular general strategy logics such as atl, where actions
are not necessarily truthful announcements, extended with epistemics, knowledge de re is not expressible. Several recent
works have focused on extending such logics in order to be able to express knowledge de re and other interaction properties
between knowledge and ability [15,1,14,7]. In the special case of GAL, however, it turns out that knowledge de re in fact is
already expressible (in the single agent case, at least), as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 26.
1. Knowledge de dicto (1) is expressed by the formula Ki〈i〉φ .
2. Knowledge de re (2) is expressed by the formula 〈i〉Kiφ .
Proof.
1. Immediate.
2. Let M be a model and s a state in M. Agent i knows de re that she can achieve φ iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) | Kiψ and ∀t ∈
S (s ∼i t ⇒ (M, t) | 〈Kiψ〉φ)) iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) | Kiψ and ∀t ∈ S (s ∼i t ⇒ (M, t) | Kiψ and M|Kiψ, t | φ)) iff,
since M, s | Kiψ and s ∼i t implies that M, t | Kiψ , ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) | Kiψ and ∀t ∈ S (s ∼i t ⇒ M|Kiψ, t | φ))
iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) | Kiψ and ∀t ∈ S (M, t | Kiψ and (s ∼i t ⇒ M|Kiψ, t | φ))) iff, again since M, s | Kiψ and
s ∼i t implies that M, t | Kiψ , ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) | Kiψ and ∀t ∈ S (M, t | Kiψ and ((M, t | Kiψ and s ∼i t) ⇒
M|Kiψ, t | φ))) iff ∃ψ ∈ Lel((M, s) | Kiψ and M|Kiψ, s | Kiφ) iff (M, s) | 〈i〉Kiφ. 
Thus, i knows de re that she can achieve φ iff she can achieve the fact that she knows φ. This depends crucially on
the fact that by ‘achieve’ we mean achieve by truthful public announcements; it is not true if we allow general actions. As
an illustration of the latter case, take the following example. An agent i is in front of a combination lock safe. The agent
does not know the combination. The available actions correspond to dialing different codes. The agent is able to open the
safe, 〈i〉open, because there is a successful action (dial the correct code). She knows de dicto that she can open the safe,
Ki〈i〉open, because this is true in all the states she considers possible (a possible state correspond to a possible correct
code). But she does not know de re that she can open the safe, because there is no code that will open the safe in all the
states she considers possible. However, 〈i〉Kiopen does hold: there is some action she can perform (dial the correct code)
after which she will know that the safe is open. In GAL, the fact that 〈i〉Kiφ expresses (2) is a result of the inter-dependence
between knowledge and actions (announcements) and the S5 properties of knowledge. The following are some properties
of knowledge de dicto and de re in GAL.
Proposition 27. The following are valid.
1. Ki〈i〉φ → 〈i〉φ . Knowledge de dicto of ability implies ability; if you know that you can do it then you can do it.
2. 〈i〉Kiφ → Ki〈i〉φ . Knowledge de re implies knowledge de dicto; if you know how to do it you know that you can do it.
3. 〈i〉Kiφ ↔ Ki〈i〉Kiφ . Knowledge de re holds iff knowledge of knowledge de re holds; you know how to do it iff you know that.
Proof. The ﬁrst point is immediate from reﬂexivity of the accessibility relations. The second point is also immediate; let ψ
be ﬁxed by (2). For the third point, the direction to the left is immediate by point 1, so consider the direction to the right.
Assume that M, s | 〈i〉Kiφ, i.e., that (2) holds. Let u ∼i s. We must show that ∃ψ ∈ Lel ∀t ∼i u (M, t) | 〈Kiψ〉φ. Let ψ be
as in (2), and let t ∼i u. By transitivity of ∼i we have that t ∼i s, and thus that (M, t) | 〈Kiψ〉φ by (2). 
On ﬁrst sight the expression 〈i〉Kiφ of knowledge de re might seem to suffer from a similar problem as the expression
of ‘mere’ ability of the ﬁrst type we discussed above, 〈i〉ψ , namely that while i has the ability to make ψ come about she
does not necessarily know this (de dicto). However, as the last point in the proposition above shows, if ψ is of the special
form Kiφ (for the same agent i), then ability does in fact imply knowledge of ability. In every circumstance where you can
achieve a state where you know φ, you know that you can.
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not imply knowledge de re. Given our expressions of these two properties, we thus have that
Ki〈i〉φ → 〈i〉Kiφ is not valid
that you know that you can achieve φ does not necessarily mean that you can achieve a state where you know φ.
6.2. More than one agent
In the case of more than one agent, there are even more subtleties. In particular, what does it mean that a group knows
how to achieve something, i.e., knows which joint announcement will be effective? That everybody knows it? That they
have common knowledge of it?
In [15] it is argued that the answer depends on the situation. It might be the case that the agents have common knowl-
edge (although they then need some resolution mechanism for cases when there are more than one effective announcement,
in order to coordinate); that every agent knows the effective announcement; that the agents have distributed knowledge
about the effective announcement and thus can pool their knowledge together to ﬁnd out what they should do; that a
particular agent (the ‘leader’) knows the effective announcement and can communicate it to the others.
In GAL we do not have distributed or common knowledge in the language, but “everybody knows” can be deﬁned:
EGφ ≡∧i∈G Kiφ, where G is a coalition. The following generalization of (2) says that in state s coalition G can make a
truthful announcement which all the members of G know will achieve the goal φ:
∃{ψi}i∈G ⊆ Lel ∀(t, s) ∈
⋃
i∈G
∼i (M, t) |
〈∧
i∈G
Kiψi
〉
φ. (3)
However, while the single agent case (2) is expressed by 〈i〉Kiφ, it is not in general the case that (3) is expressed by
〈G〉EGφ. The following is a counterexample. Let M and φ be the following model and formula.
•p,¬qt
•p,qs
1
2
•¬p,qu
φ = p ∧ q
Let G = {1,2}. It is easy to see that group G in s does not know de re that they can achieve φ in the sense of (3): it would
imply, for instance, that it is possible to make an announcement in state t which at the same time eliminates state t –
which is impossible. However, 〈1,2〉EGφ holds in s – {1,2} can announce K1p ∧ K2q.
Let us consider distributed and common knowledge. Assume for a moment that the language is extended with operators
CG and DG where G is a coalition, such that M, s | DGφ iff for all (s, t) ∈⋂i∈G ∼i M, t | φ and M, s | CGφ iff for all
(s, t) ∈ ∼G∗M, t | φ, where ∼G∗ is the reﬂexive transitive closure of ⋃i∈G ∼i . The following version of (3) says that in s,
G can make a truthful announcement which G distributively know will achieve the goal φ:
∃{ψi}i∈G ⊆ Lel ∀t ∈ S
(
(s, t) ∈
⋂
i∈G
∼i ⇒ (M, t) |
〈∧
i∈G
Kiψi
〉
φ
)
. (4)
Contrary to the case for “everybody knows”, this property is in fact expressed by the analogue to the expression for the
single-agent case (can be shown similarly to Proposition 27 – observe that (s, t) ∈⋂i∈G and M, s |∧i∈G Kiψi implies that
M, t |∧i∈G Kiψi):
Proposition 28. The property (4) is expressed by the formula 〈G〉DGφ .
The situation for common knowledge is, however, similar to that of “everybody knows”. The following version of (4) says
that in s G can make a truthful announcement which G commonly know will achieve the goal φ:
∃{ψi}i∈G ⊆ Lel ∀t∼G∗s(M, t) |
〈∧
i∈G
Kiψi
〉
φ. (5)
The model M, formula φ and coalition G = {1,2} above is a counterexample showing that (5) is not expressed by 〈G〉CGφ:
(5) does not hold in state s, but M, s | 〈G〉CGφ.
Summing up, it can be argued that all of the different notions of ability discussed in this section are useful. For example,
in different contexts it might be useful to reason about what an agent can achieve by guessing the right actions to perform,
while in others what she can achieve by identifying the correct actions with certainty. It is, however, of vital importance to
discern between these different notions, for example in the analysis of security protocols.
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Consider a sender and a receiver attempt to communicate a secret to each other without an eavesdropper learning it.
A very powerful eavesdropper is one that intercepts all communications. This creates the setting where sender, receiver,
and eavesdropper are three agents that can be modelled in a multi-S5 system and where all communications are public
announcements by sender and receiver. One speciﬁc example of such a setting is known as the Russian Cards Problem [19].
The setting is one where a pack of all different cards are distributed over the three ‘players’, where every player only knows
his own cards, where sender and receiver have an informational advantage over the eavesdropper because they hold more
cards, and where the ‘secrets’ that should not be divulged are about card ownership. Posed as a riddle it looks as follows –
Anne and Bill are sender and receiver, Cath the eavesdropper:
From a pack of seven known cards 0,1,2,3,4,5,6 Anne and Bill each draw three cards and Cath gets the remaining
card. How can Anne and Bill openly (publicly) inform each other about their cards, without Cath learning from any of
their cards who holds it?
To simplify matters, assume that Anne has drawn {0,1,2}, that Bill has drawn {3,4,5} and that Cath therefore has card 6.
The initial Kripke model D describing this setting consists of all possible card deals (valuations). In that model an epistemic
class for an agent can be identiﬁed with the hand of cards of that agent. For example, given that Anne holds {0,1,2},
she cannot distinguish the four deals – allow us to use some suggestive notation – 012.345.6, 012.346.5, 012.356.4, and
012.456.3 from one another.
Given that all announcements that can be made by a player are known by that player, they consist of unions of equiv-
alence classes for that player and can therefore be identiﬁed with sets of alternative hands for that player. One solution is
where
Anne says “My hand of cards is one of 012,034,056,135,246” after which Bill says “My hand of cards is one of
345,125,024.”
The last is equivalent in that information state to Bill saying “Cath has card 6”. Anne and Bill in fact execute a protocol
here, not in the sense of sets of sequences of announcements but in the sense of functions from local states of agents to
nondeterministic choice between announcements. For example, Anne is executing “given cards i, j,k, the ﬁrst of my ﬁve
hands is that actual hand i jk; the second of my ﬁve hands to announce is ikl where k, l are chosen from the ﬁve remaining
cards; the third is imn where m,n are the remaining two cards; etc.; shuﬄe the hands before announcing them.”
We can describe this solution in logic. Agent a stands for Anne, b for Bill, and c for Cath. Let qi stand for ‘agent i holds
card q’ and let klmi stand for ki ∧ li ∧ mi . The information and safety requirements are as follows – the conjunction in
the formula suggests a conjunction over all hands of cards, ‘Cath does not learn any card’ means ‘Cath does not learn the
ownership of any card except her own card.’
Anne learns Bill’s cards
∧
i jk(i jkb → Kai jkb) (one)
Bill learns Anne’s cards
∧
i jk(i jka → Kbi jka) (two)
Cath does not learn any card
∧6
q=0((qa → ¬Kcqa)∧ (qb → ¬Kcqb)) (three)
These requirements should hold throughout the model after protocol completion (i.e., they should be common knowledge
between Ann and Bill). The safety requirement should be satisﬁed both at the end and in all intermediate stages: after any
announcement that forms part of such a protocol.
All protocols are ﬁnite, because the model is ﬁnite and all informative announcements result in proper model restriction.
But it is unclear how long such protocols need to be. The above solution was of length two, but settings that require strictly
longer protocols are also known. The uncertain but ﬁnite length cannot be described in public announcement logic, but
it can be described in group announcement logic. The diamond in 〈ab〉φ refers to arbitrarily ﬁnite length protocols taking
place between sender a and receiver b in the presence of other agents, such as the eavesdropper, as was discussed in
Section 3.3.2.
Let us see how this works for the length-two protocol above that solves the Russian Cards Problem. First, we model
the solution in public announcement logic. In the solution, ﬁrst Anne announces 012a ∨ 034a ∨ 056a ∨ 135a ∨ 246a (anne).
Then Bill announces 345b ∨ 125b ∨ 024b (bill). After these two announcements the solution requirements are satisﬁed. This
can now be described in various ways: as a sequence of two announcements by different agents, as a sequence of two
simultaneous announcements by Anne and Bill, or as a single announcement by Anne and Bill.
D,012.345.6 | 〈Kaanne〉〈Kbbill〉(one∧ two∧ three)
D,012.345.6 | 〈Kaanne∧ Kb〉〈Ka ∧ Kbbill〉(one∧ two∧ three)
D,012.345.6 | 〈Ka(anne∧ [Kaanne∧ Kb])∧ Kb( ∧ [Kaanne∧ Kb]bill)〉(one∧ two∧ three)
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D,012.345.6 | 〈ab〉(one∧ two∧ three)
Given that we should be able to realize the three postconditions after any execution of the underlying protocol, and regard-
less of the initial card deal, the existence of a successful protocol to realize them can be expressed all at once by the model
validity
D | 〈ab〉(one∧ two∧ three)
or in other words
“〈ab〉(one∧ two∧ three) is valid in the initial model for card deals” (6)
In principle, we can now model check this formula in that model, thus establishing that a secure exchange is possible under
the uncertainty conditions about card ownership in a fully automated way.
We have so far overlooked one aspect of the meaning of announcements executing such protocols. The security require-
ment three should be an invariant: its validity throughout the model should be preserved after every good announcement.
In this particular case we can enforce that, because its negation is a positive formula: if it is ever not preserved, then it is
lost forever afterwards. Therefore, it suﬃces to guarantee it after the execution of the protocol. Thus the above expression
also incorporates that invariance.
One must be careful when interpreting the meaning the existence of sequences of announcements. If we can replace the
two successive announcements: Anne says “My hand of cards is one of 012,034,056,135,246” after which Bill says “My
hand of cards is one of 345,125,024”, by a single one, does that not mean that all protocols can be reduced to length 1?
And what would in this case that single simultaneous announcement be? Well: as both agents are announcing facts and not
knowledge, their single announcement is simply the conjunction of their successive announcements. As the second one for
Anne and the ﬁrst one for Bill was ‘true’ (vacuous), this means that they could simultaneously have made their successive
announcements: Anne says “My hand of cards is one of 012,034,056,135,246” and simultaneously Bill says “My hand
of cards is one of 345,125,024”. Unfortunately, even though this indeed solves the problem, the agents do not know the
public consequences of their joint action merely from the public consequences of their individual part in it. This situation
was discussed in the previous section: there is a simultaneous announcement by Ann and Bill which will achieve the goal,
but Ann and Bill do not know that their respective announcements will achieve the goal – they will not achieve the goal in
all the states they consider possible. A different execution of the protocol for Anne, when she holds cards {0,1,2}, is the
announcement “My hand of cards is one of 012,035,046,134,256”. From that with Bill’s above announcement Cath can
deduce straightaway that the card deal is 012.345.6. And, obviously, Bill does not know whether Anne is going to announce
the original or the alternative set of ﬁve hands, or any of many others. In epistemic terms,we can sum up our achievements
for this security setting as follows, also using the discussion and results of Section 6.
D | 〈ab〉(one∧ two∧ three) (7)
D | 〈ab〉Ka(one∧ two∧ three) (8)
D | 〈ab〉Kb(one∧ two∧ three) (9)
D | 〈a〉Ka
(
two∧ three∧ 〈b〉Kb(one∧ two∧ three)
)
(10)
Recall (Proposition 26.2) that a formula of the form 〈i〉Kiφ expresses the fact that agent i knows de re that she can achieve
φ; that she can make an announcement that will ensure that φ is true in any state that i considers possible. Thus, the last
formula above, (10), expresses the fact that there is an announcement that Anne can make after which Bill has learnt her
cards and Cath remains ignorant, no matter which of the four card deals Anne considers possible is the actual one, and such
that Bill then can make an announcement after which all three requirements hold. Thus, it is rational for Ann to make that
announcement, and for Bill to make a proper counter announcement in the resulting state. Unlike the property (6), (10)
shows that Ann and Bill know how to execute a successful protocol.
8. Conclusions
We proposed an extension of public announcement logic with constructs 〈G〉φ, where G is a group of agents, with
the intuitive meaning that G can jointly execute a publicly observable action such that φ will be true afterwards. This
included sequences of such joint actions and also protocols with alternating actions by different agents, in response to
the actions of others. The logic is completely axiomatizable, using the same method as for arbitrary announcement logic.
The model checking problem for public announcement logic is PSPACE-complete. Both ‘knowing how’ (knowing de re) and
‘knowing that’ (knowing de dicto) can be expressed in our framework. Requirements for ﬁnite-length protocols can also be
investigated in group announcement logic.
We anticipate some further research. A simple extension to the language would also allowing factual change, apart
from informational change. This would make the correspondence with multi-player games even more direct. A different,
T. Ågotnes et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 8 (2010) 62–81 81and further, generalization would be with non-public actions, such as private messages involving subgroups, card showing
actions, etc. This is also technically conceivable, but slightly further down the road, we think.
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